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排序方式: 共有499条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Nicholas Apergis Matteo Bonato Rangan Gupta Clement Kyei 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(6):684-696
AbstractWe use the k-th-order nonparametric causality test at monthly frequency over the period of 1985:1 to 2016:06 to analyze whether geopolitical risks can predict movements in stock returns and volatility of 24 global defense firms. The nonparametric approach controls for the existing misspecification of a linear framework of causality, and hence, the mild evidence of causality obtained under the standard Granger tests cannot be relied upon. When we apply the nonparametric test, we find that there is no evidence of predictability of stock returns of these defense companies emanating from the geopolitical risk measure. However, the geopolitical risk index does predict realized volatility in 50% of the companies. Our results indicate that while global geopolitical events over a period of time is less likely to predict returns, such global risks are more inclined in affecting future risk profile of defense firms. 相似文献
62.
Jun Ando 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(7):794-808
AbstractThis study estimates a three-sector Feder–Ram model using US annual data for 1965–2014 to confirm the externality of defense expenditure in the United States. Although the model is often used in the literature to scrutinize whether this effect exists, a flaw intrinsic to this model is the appearance of multicollinearity. In this study, I introduced novel techniques, namely: the standardization and estimation of a simple slope, to estimate the model. The results are as follows. First, I prove that the multicollinearity problem can be resolved by standardization. Second, externality, which is judged to conventionally exist, is not found. Third, increases in defense expenditure bring about positive but limited economic growth when the ratio of private to defense expenditure in the previous year ranges from 5.09 to 6.82%. By re-estimating the model, this study contributes to developing the Feder–Ram model within the related literature. 相似文献
63.
AbstractThis study applies the Sequential Panel Selection Method (SPSM), to investigate the convergence properties of the military expenditure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the period of 1990–2015. Compared to the traditional methods, SPSM considers fundamentally general spatial homogeneous and heterogeneous relationships with countries and examines the evolution of military expenditure. We find that four-fifths of NATO member countries have been convergent with the UK, but no country’s military expenditure is convergent with the US. This means that there is no significant linkage effect in the US for NATO military expenditure. While they are allies of the US, the majority of NATO member countries’ military expenditures are consistent with UK military expenditure. The main reasons are due to the geographical space layout and the international relationship convergence. The results indicate that more than four-fifths of NATO member countries have been coordinated with convergence theory and spillover effect. 相似文献
64.
MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATES
The effect of military expenditure on economic growth in developing countries has been investigated by many empirical literatures. However, there is little consensus of that effect and the diversity seems to come from the use of different models and different estimators. This article applies the Augmented Solow Growth Model to examine the influence of military expenditure on economic growth for 35 developing countries over the period of 1975–2009. By using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, empirical results indicate that defence has a negative and significant effect on economic growth in the sample countries. 相似文献
65.
SUZANNA-MARIA PALEOLOGOU 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):419-428
This paper examines the impact of military spending on general government debt in the enlarged European Union (EU) countries. For this purpose, we use panel data analysis and provide estimates from a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel model. The dynamics are found to be important and the results suggest that military expenditures do have a large positive impact on the share of general government debt in the EU. 相似文献
66.
This paper sets up a monetary endogenous growth model, and uses it to explain the ambiguous linkage between the military burden and the inflation rate observed in existing empirical studies. It is found that an expansion in the military burden has an ambiguous effect on the inflation rate depending upon the relative extent of two conflicting forces. More specifically, if the increase in the marginal benefit from holding money exceeds (falls short of) the increase in the marginal product of private capital, the inflation rate will rise (fall) in response. Moreover, it is found that an increase in the military burden will stimulate the balanced growth rate, confirming Benoit’s famous empirical findings. 相似文献
67.
Christos Kollias 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(6):589-607
Cyprus, a small island state, gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. For more that half its history as an independent state Cyprus has been under occupation following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Despite the fact that it has faced war, invasion and occupation, Cyprus has allocated a comparatively small proportion of its national income to defence. The average defence burden—military expenditure as a share of GDP—during 1964–98 was around 2.5%. However, as a result of a substantial shift in defence policy during the past decade or so, the defence burden during the 1990s has increased, averaging about 4% of GDP as Cyprus decided to implement an extensive military modernization program aiming to present a more credible military deterrence vis‐a‐vis Turkey. Empirical estimations of a demand function for Cypriot military expenditure suggest that it is positively affected by alliance spillins and external military threat. 相似文献
68.
Marc Aufrant 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(1):79-102
Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness. 相似文献
69.
Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero. 相似文献
70.